This is particularly
remarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of
all moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of
sentiment. It is impossible that, in any particular instance, this
hypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible, whatever specious
figure it may make in general declamations and discourses. Examine the
crime of INGRATITUDE, for instance; which has place, wherever we observe
good-will, expressed and known, together with good-offices performed, on
the one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices
or neglect on the other: anatomize all these circumstances, and examine,
by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame. You never
will come to any issue or conclusion.

Reason judges either of MATTER OF FACT or of RELATIONS. Enquire then,
first, where is that matter of fact which we here call crime; point
it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or
nature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself. It
resides in the mind of the person who is ungrateful. He must, therefore,
feel it, and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the
passion of ill-will or absolute indifference. You cannot say that these,
of themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes. No, they
are only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed
and displayed good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer, that the
crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual FACT; but arises
from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the
spectator, excites the SENTIMENT of blame, by the particular structure
and fabric of his mind.

This representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in
a particular FACT, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it
consists in certain MORAL RELATIONS, discovered by reason, in the same
manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra.
But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case
stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person;
then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is a
relation of CONTARIETY. Does the crime consist in that relation? But
suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in
return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good offices. Here is
the same relation of CONTRARIETY; and yet my conduct is often high