ldom
liable to great controversy. But as single instances of justice are
often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the
advantage to society results only from the observance of the general
rule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in
the same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and
involved. The various circumstances of society; the various consequences
of any practice; the various interests which may be proposed; these,
on many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and
inquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions
with regard to justice: the debates of civilians; the reflections of
politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are all
directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate REASON or JUDGEMENT is
often requisite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate
doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities.
But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient
to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and
actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or
approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the
end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference
towards the means. It is requisite a SENTIMENT should here display
itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious
tendencies. This SENTIMENT can be no other than a feeling for the
happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are
the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote.
Here therefore REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of actions,
and HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and
beneficial.
This partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment, in
all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding hypothesis. But I
shall suppose that hypothesis false: it will then be requisite to look
out for some other theory that may be satisfactory; and I dare venture
to affirm that none such will ever be found, so long as we suppose
reason to be the sole source of morals. To prove this, it will be proper
t o weigh the five following considerations.
I. It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of
truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes use of undefined terms,
and employs comparisons, instead of instances.
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