and they give into the snare;
whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of
reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with
mankind.

But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has
any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection,
will discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes,
and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with
themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws.
How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? And in a
view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of
conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of
nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct; what
comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty amusements of
luxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without
price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and
above it in their enjoyment.

APPENDIX I. CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT

IF the foregoing hypothesis be received, it will now be easy for us to
determine the question first started, [FOOTNOTE: Sect. 1.] concerning
the general principles of morals; and though we postponed the
decision of that question, lest it should then involve us in intricate
speculations, which are unfit for moral discourses, we may resume it at
present, and examine how far either REASON or SENTIMENT enters into all
decisions of praise or censure.

One principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the
usefulness of any quality or action, it is evident that REASON must
enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since
nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities
and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society
and to their possessor. In many cases this is an affair liable to great
controversy: doubts may arise; opposite interests may occur; and a
preference must be given to one side, from very nice views, and a small
overbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions
with regard to justice; as is, indeed, natural to suppose, from that
species of utility which attends this virtue [Footnote: See App. II.].
Were every single instance of justice, like that of benevolence, useful
to society; this would be a more simple state of the case, and se