ife: (1) if she
divorced her husband for grave reasons or crime, she retained her dowry
and could remarry after five years; (2) if she divorced him for criminal
conduct or moderate faults, she forfeited her dowry, became incapable of
remarriage, and liable to deportation, nor could the emperor's
prerogative of pardon be exerted in her favour. As regards a husband: if
he divorced his wife (1) for serious crime, he retained the dowry and
could remarry immediately; (2) for criminal conduct, he did not retain
the dowry, but could remarry; (3) for mere dislike, he forfeited the
property brought into the marriage and could not remarry.

In A.D. 449 the law of divorce was rendered simpler and certainly more
facile by Theodosius and Valentinian. It was provided that a wife could
divorce her husband without incurring any penalty if he was convicted of
any one of twelve offences: (1) treason, (2) adultery, (3) homicide, (4)
poisoning, (5) forgery, (6) violating tombs, (7) stealing from a church,
(8) robbery, (9) cattle-stealing, (10) attempting his wife's life, (11)
beating his wife, (12) introducing immoral women to his house. If the
wife divorced her husband for any other cause, she forfeited her dowry,
and could not marry again for five years. A husband could divorce his
wife without incurring a penalty for any of these reasons except the
last, and also for the following reasons: (1) going to dine with men
other than her relations without the knowledge or against the wish of
her husband; (2) going from home at night against his wish without
reasonable cause; (3) frequenting the circus, theatre or amphitheatre
after being forbidden by her husband. If a husband divorced his wife for
any other reason, he forfeited all interest in his wife's dowry, and
also any property he brought into the marriage.

The above sketch of the legislation prior to the time of Justinian,
while it indicates a desire to place the husband and wife on something
like terms of equality as regards divorce, indicates also, by its
forbidding remarriage and by its pecuniary provisions in certain cases,
a sense in the community of the importance in the public interest of
restraining the violation of the contract of marriage. But to the Roman
marriage was primarily a contract, and therefore side by side with this
legislation there always existed a power of divorce by mutual consent.
We must now turn to those principles of the Christian religion which, in
combina