. 144): "Si maritus fuerit erga uxorem crudelis et ferax ac
mortem comminatus et machinatus fuerit, vel eam inhumaniter verbis et
verberibus tractaverit, et aliquando venenum loco potus paraverit vel
aliquod simile commiserit, propter quod sine periculo vitae cum marito
cohabitare aut obsequia conjugalia impendere non audeat ... consimili
etiam causa competit viro contra mulierem." Lord Stowell, probably the
greatest master of the civil and canon law who ever sat in an English
court of justice, has in one of his most famous judgments (_Evans_ v.
_Evans_, 1790, 1 Hagg. _Consist._ 35) echoed the above language in words
often quoted, which have constituted the standard exposition of the law
to the present day. "In the older cases," he said, "of this sort which I
have had the opportunity of looking into, I have observed that the
danger of life, limb or health is usually insisted as the ground upon
which the court has proceeded to a separation. This doctrine has been
repeatedly applied by the court in the cases which have been cited. The
court has never been driven off this ground. It has always been jealous
of the inconvenience of departing from it, and I have heard no one case
cited in which the court has granted a divorce without proof given of a
reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. I say an apprehension, because
assuredly the court is not to wait till the hurt is actually done; but
the apprehension must be reasonable: it must not be an apprehension
arising from an exquisite and diseased sensibility of mind. Petty
vexations applied to such a constitution of mind may certainly in time
wear out the animal machine, but still they are not cases of legal
relief; people must relieve themselves as well as they can by prudent
resistance, by calling in the succours of religion and the consolation
of friends; but the aid of courts is not to be resorted to in such cases
with any effect." The risk of personal danger in cohabitation
constituted, therefore, the foundation of legal cruelty. But this does
not exclude such conduct as a course of persistent ill-treatment, though
not amounting to personal violence, especially if such ill-treatment has
in fact caused injury to health. But the person complaining must not be
the author of his or her own wrong. If, accordingly, one of the spouses
by his or her conduct is really the cause of the conduct complained of,
recourse to the court would be had in vain, the true remedy lying in a
reform