ised by those who sing the verses of
Euphorion. He is sensible that all things which come on a sudden are
harder to be borne. Therefore, when he had set off the riches of Priam to
the best advantage, which had the appearance of a long continuance, what
does he add?--

Lo, these all perish'd in one blazing pile;
The foe old Priam of his life beguiled,
And with his blood, thy altar, Jove, defiled.

Admirable poetry! There is something mournful in the subject, as well as
in the words and measure. We must drive away this grief of her's: how is
that to be done? Shall we lay her on a bed of down: introduce a singer;
shall we burn cedar, or present her with some pleasant liquor, and provide
her something to eat? Are these the good things which remove the most
afflicting grief? for you but just now said you knew of no other good. I
should agree with Epicurus that we ought to be called off from grief to
contemplate good things, if we could only agree upon what was good.

XX. It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and
that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for I
am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and
delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am
speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold those
pleasures in contempt, which he just now commended, yet I must remember
wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with barely
saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says, that taste, and
embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes
with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I
misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I
endeavouring at, but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the
same man says, that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that
to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three
very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts
himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good, unless the
senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that
to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one contradict
himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is naturally a
threefold division, the first, to be pleased; next, to be in pain; the
last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor