constant and wise man. We may even allow a
centurion, or standard-bearer, to be angry, or any others, whom, not to
explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not mention
here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come at, may have
its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a wise man.

XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you pity
rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because you
cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on ourselves
upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of their grief if
we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to rival him with
that vicious emulation, which resembles an enmity, of what use can that
conduct be? Now envy implies being uneasy at another's good because one
does not enjoy it oneself; but detraction is the being uneasy at another's
good, merely because he enjoys it. How can it be right that you should
voluntarily grieve, rather than take the trouble of acquiring what you
want to have; for it is madness in the highest degree to desire to be the
only one that has any particular happiness. But who can with correctness
speak in praise of a mediocrity of evils? Can any one in whom there is
lust or desire, be otherwise than libidinous or desirous? or can a man who
is occupied by anger avoid being angry? or can one who is exposed to any
vexation escape being vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must
he not be fearful? Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the
anxious, and the timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which
I could speak very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as
possible. And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all
divine and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything.
Hence it is, that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human
concerns as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your
opinion that such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea
is exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and
constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind
befal one, to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to
man? Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and
only what is natural remain; what, I pray you, can be natural, which may
be too exuberant?

XXVII. All the