pedestal, I found the inscription, though the latter parts of all
the verses were effaced almost half away. Thus one of the noblest cities
of Greece, and one which at one time likewise had been very celebrated for
learning, had known nothing of the monument of its greatest genius, if it
had not been discovered to them by a native of Arpinum. But to return to
the subject from which I have been digressing. Who is there in the least
degree acquainted with the Muses, that is, with liberal knowledge, or that
deals at all in learning, who would not choose to be this mathematician
rather than that tyrant? If we look into their methods of living and their
employments, we shall find the mind of the one strengthened and improved
with tracing the deductions of reason, amused with his own ingenuity,
which is the one most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the
other engaged in continual murders and injuries, in constant fears by
night and by day. Now imagine a Democritus, a Pythagoras, and an
Anaxagoras; what kingdom, what riches would you prefer to their studies
and amusements? for you must necessarily look for that excellence which we
are seeking for in that which is the most perfect part of man; but what is
there better in man than a sagacious and good mind? The enjoyment,
therefore, of that good which proceeds from that sagacious mind, can alone
make us happy: but virtue is the good of the mind; it follows, therefore,
that a happy life depends on virtue. Hence proceed all things that are
beautiful, honourable, and excellent, as I said above (but this point
must, I think, be treated of more at large), and they are well stored with
joys. For, as it is clear that a happy life consists in perpetual and
unexhausted pleasures, it follows too, that a happy life must arise from
honesty.
XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere
words only, I must set before you the picture of something, as it were,
living and moving in the world, that may dispose us more for the
improvement of the understanding and real knowledge. Let us, then, pitch
upon some man perfectly acquainted with the most excellent arts; let us
present him for a while to our own thoughts, and figure him to our own
imaginations. In the first place, he must necessarily be of an
extraordinary capacity; for virtue is not easily connected with dull
minds. Secondly, he must have a great desire of discovering truth, from
whence will arise that
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