Antiochus, and lately with Aristo,
when, during the period of my command as general, I was lodging with him
at Athens. For to me it seemed that no one could possibly be happy under
any evil: but a wise man might be afflicted with evil, if there are any
things arising from body or fortune, deserving the name of evils. These
things were said, which Antiochus has inserted in his books in many
places: that virtue itself was sufficient to make life happy, but yet not
perfectly happy: and that many things derive their names from the
predominant portion of them, though they do not include everything, as
strength, health, riches, honour, and glory: which qualities are
determined by their kind, not their number: thus a happy life is so called
from its being so in a great degree, even though it should fall short in
some point. To clear this up, is not absolutely necessary at present,
though it seems to be said without any great consistency: for I cannot
imagine what is wanting to one that is happy, to make him happier, for if
anything be wanting to him he cannot be so much as happy; and as to what
they say, that everything is named and estimated from its predominant
portion, that may be admitted in some things. But when they allow three
kinds of evils; when any one is oppressed with every imaginable evil of
two kinds, being afflicted with adverse fortune, and having at the same
time his body worn out and harassed with all sorts of pains, shall we say
that such a one is but little short of a happy life, to say nothing about
the happiest possible life?

IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain: for after
he had once laid down the position, that stripes, torments, tortures, the
ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children, had great
influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst not any longer
use any high and lofty expressions, when he was so low and abject in his
opinion. How right he was is not the question; he certainly was
consistent. Therefore I am not for objecting to consequences where the
premises are admitted. But this most elegant and learned of all the
philosophers, is not taken to task very severely when he asserts his three
kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for that book which he
wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many arguments, why one who is
tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in that book he is supposed to
say, that a man who is placed on the