re is nothing whatever which
they consider as good but what is within their own power. Nor can I by any
means allow the same person, who falls into the vulgar opinion of good and
evil, to make use of these expressions, which can only become a great and
exalted man. Struck with which glory, up starts Epicurus, who, with
submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man always happy. He is much charmed
with the dignity of this opinion, but he never would have owned that, had
he attended to himself: for what is there more inconsistent, than for one
who could say that pain was the greatest or the only evil, to think also
that a wise man can possibly say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is
this! We are not, therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from
detached sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their
ordinary manner of talking.

XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you are
not inconsistent yourself.

_M._ In what respect?

_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and in
that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be endeavouring
to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and the
Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow that, what
reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno, that virtue
contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that the Peripatetics
should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my opinion, regard
should be had to the thing, not to words.

_M._ What? you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me
what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with
those who dispute by established rules: we live from hand to mouth, and
say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the
only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of
consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the opinion
of Zeno and his pupil Aristo be true, that nothing is good but what is
honourable; but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life
can be rested on virtue alone. Wherefore, if we certainly grant Brutus
this, that a wise man is always happy, how consistent he is, is his own
business: for who indeed is more worthy than himself of the glory of that
opinion? Still we may maintain that such a man is more happy than any one
else.

XII. Though Zeno the Cittiaean, a stranger and an inc