r design, that I disputed the first and second
day on death and pain,--the two things that are the most dreaded: now, if
what I then said was approved of, we are in a great degree freed from
fear. And this is sufficient, as far as regards the opinion of evils.

XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods--that is to say, to joy and desire.
To me, indeed, one thing alone seems to embrace the question of all that
relates to the perturbations of the mind--the fact, namely, that all
perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon opinion,
and are voluntary. This error, then, must be got rid of; this opinion must
be removed: and, as with regard to imagined evils, we are to make them
more supportable, so with respect to goods, we are to lessen the violent
effects of those things which are called great and joyous. But one thing
is to be observed, that equally relates both to good and evil: that,
should it be difficult to persuade any one that none of those things which
disturb the mind are to be looked on as good or evil, yet a different cure
is to be applied to different feelings; and the malevolent person is to be
corrected by one way of reasoning, the lover by another, the anxious man
by another, and the fearful by another: and it would be easy for any one
who pursues the best approved method of reasoning, with regard to good and
evil, to maintain that no fool can be affected with joy, as he never can
have anything good. But, at present, my discourse proceeds upon the common
received notions. Let, then, honours, riches, pleasures, and the rest, be
the very good things which they are imagined to be; yet a too elevated and
exulting joy on the possession of them is unbecoming; just as though it
might be allowable to laugh, to giggle would be indecent. Thus, a mind
enlarged by joy is as blameable as a contraction of it by grief; and eager
longing is a sign of as much levity in desiring as immoderate joy is in
possessing; and, as those who are too dejected are said to be effeminate,
so they who are too elated with joy are properly called volatile; and as
feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being pleased with another's
misfortune is a kind of joy both these feelings are usually corrected by
showing the wildness and insensibility of them: and as it becomes a man to
be cautious, but it is unbecoming in him to be fearful; so to be pleased
is proper, but to be joyful improper. I have, in order that I might be the
better