lato,
gave rise to many sects of philosophers of different sentiments: of all
which I have principally adhered to that one which, in my opinion,
Socrates himself followed; and argue so as to conceal my own opinion,
while I deliver others from their errors, and so discover what has the
greatest appearance of probability in every question. And the custom
Carneades adopted with great copiousness and acuteness, and I myself have
often given in to it on many occasions elsewhere, and in this manner, too,
I disputed lately, in my Tusculan villa; indeed I have sent you a book of
the four former days' discussions; but the fifth day, when we had seated
ourselves as before, what we were to dispute on was proposed thus:--

V. _A._ I do not think virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy life.

_M._ But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I
greatly prefer to yours.

_A._ I make no doubt of it; but your regard for him is not the business
now; the question is now what is the real character of that quality of
which I have declared my opinion. I wish you to dispute on that.

_M._ What! do you deny that virtue can possibly be sufficient for a happy
life?

_A._ It is what I entirely deny.

_M._ What! is not virtue sufficient to enable us to live as we ought,
honestly, commendably, or, in fine, to live well?

_A._ Certainly sufficient.

_M._ Can you, then, help calling any one miserable, who lives ill? or will
you deny that any one who you allow lives well, must inevitably live
happily?

_A._ Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honest,
praiseworthy, even in the midst of torments, and therefore live well.
Provided you understand what I mean by well; for when I say well, I mean
with constancy, and dignity, and wisdom, and courage; for a man may
display all these qualities on the rack; but yet the rack is inconsistent
with a happy life.

_M._ What then? is your happy life left on the outside of the prison,
whilst constancy, dignity, wisdom, and the other virtues, are surrendered
up to the executioner, and bear punishment and pain without reluctance?

_A._ You must look out for something new, if you would do any good. These
things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being common,
but principally because, like certain light wines, that will not bear
water, these arguments of the Stoics are pleasanter to taste than to
swallow. As when that assemblage of virtues is commit