appy. So that it doth not seem to be by
accident, but with reason proposed by you, that I should discuss grief,
and the other perturbations separately; for there lies the spring and head
of all our miseries: but the cure of grief, and of other disorders, is one
and the same, in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; we
take them on ourselves because it seems right so to do. Philosophy
undertakes to eradicate this error, as the root of all our evils: let us
therefore surrender ourselves to be instructed by it, and suffer ourselves
to be cured; for whilst these evils have possession of us, we not only
cannot be happy, but cannot be right in our minds. We must either deny
that reason can effect anything, while, on the other hand, nothing can be
done right without reason; or else, since philosophy depends on the
deductions of reason, we must seek from her, if we would be good or happy,
every help and assistance for living well and happily.

Book V. Whether Virtue Alone Be Sufficient For A Happy Life.

I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan Disputations:
on which day we discussed your favourite subject. For I perceive from that
book which you wrote for me, with the greatest accuracy, as well as from
your frequent conversation, that you are clearly of this opinion, that
virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy life: and though it may be
difficult to prove this, on account of the many various strokes of
fortune, yet it is a truth of such a nature, that we should endeavour to
facilitate the proof of it. For among all the topics of philosophy, there
is not one of more dignity or importance. For as the first philosophers
must have had some inducement, to neglect everything for the search of the
best state of life: surely, the inducement must have been the hope of
living happily, which impelled them to devote so much care and pains to
that study. Now, if virtue was discovered and carried to perfection by
them; and if virtue is a sufficient security for a happy life: who can
avoid thinking the work of philosophising excellently recommended by them,
and undertaken by me? But if virtue, as being subject to such various and
uncertain accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of
sufficient ability to support herself; I am afraid that it would seem
desirable rather to offer up prayers than to rely on our own confidence in
virtue, as the foundation for our hope of a happy life. And