FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433  
434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453   454   455   456   457   458   >>   >|  
I said, but not always, nor with every person; for some reject it, but much depends on the application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves, merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly then, as in pleadings we do not state all cases alike, (if I may adopt the language of lawyers for a moment,) but adapt what we have to say to the time, to the nature of the subject under debate, and to the person; so too in alleviating grief, regard should be had to what kind of cure the party to be comforted can admit of. But, somehow or other, we have rambled from what you originally proposed. For your question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil, that is not dishonourable: or at least, anything else would seem so small an evil, that by his wisdom he would so over-match it, as to make it wholly disappear; and such a man makes no addition to his grief through opinion, and never conceives it right to torment himself above measure, nor to wear himself out with grief, which is the meanest thing imaginable. Reason, however, it seems, has demonstrated, (though it was not directly our object at the moment to inquire whether anything can be called an evil except what is base,) that it is in our power to discern, that all the evil which there is in affliction has nothing natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgment of it, and the error of opinion. XXXIV. But the kind of affliction of which I have treated is that which is the greatest; in order that when we have once got rid of that, it may appear a business of less consequence to look after remedies for the others. For there are certain things which are usually said about poverty; and also certain statements ordinarily applied to retired and undistinguished life. There are particular treatises on banishment, on the ruin of one's country, on slavery, on weakness, on blindness, and on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks divide these into different treatises and distinct books: but they do it for the sake of employment: not but that all such discussions are full of entertainment; and yet, as physicians, in
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433  
434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453   454   455   456   457   458   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

affliction

 

person

 

moment

 
opinion
 

treatises

 
treated
 

greatest

 
voluntary
 

judgment

 
meanest

consequence

 
business
 
imaginable
 
object
 

inquire

 
directly
 

reject

 

demonstrated

 

called

 
natural

contracted

 

Reason

 
discern
 

Greeks

 

divide

 

blindness

 

incident

 

distinct

 

entertainment

 

physicians


discussions

 

employment

 

weakness

 
slavery
 

poverty

 

statements

 
ordinarily
 

things

 
applied
 

retired


country

 
banishment
 

undistinguished

 
remedies
 

depends

 

debate

 
method
 

subject

 

nature

 

founded