y of a consul, that all who meant well to the
republic should follow him. I do not know whether I have done anything in
the republic that has the appearance of courage; but if I have, I
certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth anything come nearer madness than
anger? And indeed Ennius has well defined it as the beginning of madness.
The changing colour, the alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes,
our manner of fetching our breath, the little command we have over our
words and actions, how little do all these things indicate a sound mind!
What can make a worse appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon,
during the quarrel. And as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright
madness, and was the occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not
want the assistance of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and
prepared of itself. We may as well say that drunkenness, or madness, are
of service to courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great
many things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave, but still he
was most brave when he was in that state of frenzy:

The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved
Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.
Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,
Forced the declining troops again t'engage.

Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?

XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of mind,
that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the highest
of all laws; or, it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment in
supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance, or a
knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining invariably a
stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them, or despise them;
or, in fewer words according to Chrysippus: (for the above definitions are
Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a layer down of definitions, as
the Stoics think: but they are all pretty much alike, they give us only
common notions, some one way, and some another.) But what is Chrysippus's
definition? Fortitude, says he, is the knowledge of all things that are
bearable: or an affection of the mind, which bears and supports everything
in obedience to the chief law of reason, without fear. Now, though we
should attack these men in the same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear
they are the only re