ere all the
circumstances of the union {102} are in common to the just and the
unjust, and no difference is in them in this respect,--as to be born and
to die, to be in health and to be in sickness, to be rich and to be
poor, and the other points of this nature. But after the departure from
the body, forthwith takes place the distinction of the just and the
unjust: for they are conducted by the angels to places corresponding
with their deserts: the souls of the just to paradise, where is the
company and the sight of angels and archangels, and also, by vision, of
the Saviour Christ, according to what is said, 'Being absent from the
body, and present with the Lord;' and the souls of the unjust to the
places in hades, according to what is said of Nebucodonosor king of
Babylon, 'Hades from beneath hath been embittered, meeting thee.'--And
in the places corresponding with their deserts they are kept in ward
unto the day of the resurrection and of retribution." [Page 469.]

I much regret to observe that Bellarmin omits to quote the latter part
of this passage, stopping short with an "&c." at the words _hades_, or
_inferorum loca_, although the whole of the writer's testimony in it
turns upon the very last clause. [Bellarmin, c. iv. p. 851. "Improborum
autem ad inferorum loca."]

The next question (76) runs thus: "If the retribution of our deeds does
not take place before the resurrection, what advantage accrued to the
thief that his soul was introduced into paradise; especially since
paradise is an object of sense, and the substance of the soul is not an
object of sense?

"Answer. It was an advantage to the thief entering into paradise to
learn by fact the benefits of the faith by which he was deemed worthy of
the assembly of the {103} saints, in which he is kept till the day of
judgment and restitution; and he has the perception of paradise by that
which is called intellectual perception, by which souls see both
themselves and the things under them, and moreover also the angels and
demons. For a soul doth not perceive or see a soul, nor an angel an
angel, nor a demon a demon; except that according to the said
intellectual perception they see both themselves and each other, and
moreover also all corporeal objects." [Page 470.]

On this same point I must here subjoin a passage from one of Justin's
own undisputed works. In his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, sect. 5, he
says, "Nevertheless I do not say that souls all die; for