as good a right to an
opinion as they, do not agree with them in their judgments; nor upon
the further fact that the standard of beauty is a thing that has varied
from age to age, differs widely in different countries, and presents
minor variations in different classes even in the same community.
The dogmatic utterances of those who are keenly susceptible to the
aesthetic aspects of things but are not given to reflection stand in
striking contrast to the epitome of the popular wisdom expressed in the
skeptical adage that there is no disputing about tastes.
We cannot interpret this adage broadly and take it literally, for then
we should have to admit that men's judgments as to the beautiful cannot
constitute the material of a science at all, and that there can be no
such thing as progress in the fine arts. The notion of progress
implies a standard, and an approximation to an ideal. Few would dare
to deny that there has been progress in such arts as painting and
music; and when one has admitted so much as this, one has virtually
admitted that a science of aesthetics is, at least, possible.
The science studies the facts of the aesthetic life as ethics studies
the facts of the moral life. It can take no man's taste as furnishing
a standard: it must take every man's taste as a fact of significance.
It is driven to reflective analysis--to such questions as, what is
beauty? and what is meant by aesthetic progress? It deals with elusive
psychological facts the significance of which is not easily grasped.
It is a philosophical science, and is by no means in a position to
follow a beaten path, dispensing with a reflective analysis of its
materials.
[1] Preface.
[2] section 269.
[3] section 376.
[4] "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book I, Chapter III.
CHAPTER XIX
METAPHYSICS
74. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?--The reader has probably already remarked that
in some of the preceding chapters the adjectives "metaphysical" and
"philosophical" have been used as if they were interchangeable, in
certain connections, at least. This is justified by common usage; and
in the present chapter I shall be expected by no one, I think, to prove
that metaphysics is a philosophical discipline. My task will rather be
to show how far the words "metaphysics" and "philosophy" have a
different meaning.
In Chapters III to XI, I have given a general view of the problems
which present themselves to reflective thought, a
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