lieves that idolaters might be
induced to give over worshiping the heavenly bodies could they be
persuaded that these are nothing more than their own ideas.
With the various forms of subjective idealism it is usual to contrast
the doctrine of _Objective Idealism_. This does not maintain that the
world which I perceive is my "idea"; it maintains that the world is
"idea."
It is rather a nice question, and one which no man should decide
without a careful examination of the whole matter, whether we have any
right to retain the word "idea" when we have rubbed out the distinction
which is usually drawn between ideas and external things. If we
maintain that all men are always necessarily selfish, we stretch the
meaning of the word quite beyond what is customary, and selfishness
becomes a thing we have no reason to disapprove, since it characterizes
saint and sinner alike. Similarly, if we decide to name "idea," not
only what the plain man and the realist admit to have a right to that
name, but also the great system which these men call an external
material world, it seems right to ask; Why use the word "idea" at all?
What does it serve to indicate? Not a distinction, surely, for the
word seems to be applicable to all things without distinction.
Such considerations as these lead me to object to the expression
"objective idealism": if the doctrine is really _objective_, _i.e._ if
it recognizes a system of things different and distinct from what men
commonly call ideas, it scarcely seems to have a right to the title
_idealism_; and if it is really _idealism_, and does not rob the word
idea of all significance, it can scarcely be _objective_ in any proper
sense of the word.
Manifestly, there is need of a very careful analysis of the meaning of
the word "idea," and of the proper significance of the terms
"subjective" and "objective," if error is to be avoided and language
used soberly and accurately. Those who are not in sympathy with the
doctrine of the objective idealists think that in such careful analysis
and accurate statement they are rather conspicuously lacking.
We think of Hegel (1770-1831) as the typical objective idealist. It is
not easy to give an accurate account of his doctrine, for he is far
from a clear writer, and he has made it possible for his many admirers
to understand him in many ways. But he seems to have accepted the
system of things that most men call the real external world, and to
have r
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