e at all to inform us regarding _what ought to be_.

But men do not merely act; they judge their actions in the light of
some norm or standard, and they distinguish between them as right and
wrong. The systematic study of actions as right and wrong yields us
the science of ethics.

Like psychology, ethics is a special science. It is concerned with a
somewhat limited field of investigation, and is not to be confounded
with other sciences. It has a definite aim distinct from theirs. And,
also like psychology, ethics is classed as one of the philosophical
sciences, and its relation to philosophy is supposed to be closer than
that of such sciences as physics and mathematics. It is fair to ask
why this is so. Why cannot ethics proceed on the basis of certain
assumptions independently, and leave to some other discipline the whole
question of an inquiry into the nature and validity of those
assumptions?

About half a century ago Dr. William Whewell, one of the most learned
of English scholars, wrote a work entitled "The Elements of Morality,"
in which he attempted to treat the science of ethics as it is generally
admitted that one may treat the science of geometry. The book was
rather widely read a generation since, but we meet with few references
to it in our time.

"Morality and the philosophy of morality," argues the author, "differ
in the same manner and in the same degree as geometry and the
philosophy of geometry. Of these two subjects, geometry consists of a
series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another,
in succession, by rigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain
definitions and self-evident axioms. The philosophy of geometry is
quite a different subject; it includes such inquiries as these: Whence
is the cogency of geometrical proof? What is the evidence of the
axioms and definitions? What are the faculties by which we become
aware of their truth? and the like. The two kinds of speculation have
been pursued, for the most part, by two different classes of
persons,--the geometers and the metaphysicians; for it has been far
more the occupation of metaphysicians than of geometers to discuss such
questions as I have stated, the nature of geometrical proofs,
geometrical axioms, the geometrical faculty, and the like. And if we
construct a complete system of geometry, it will be almost exactly the
same, whatever be the views which we take on these metaphysical
questions." [1]