he sciences not
classed as philosophical, so it is possible to make a useful study of
mental phenomena without entering upon metaphysical analyses. In
science, as in common life, we can _use_ concepts without subjecting
them to careful analysis.
Thus, our common experience reveals that mind and body are connected.
We may, for a specific purpose, leave the _nature_ of this connection
vague, and may pay careful attention to the physiological conditions of
mental phenomena, studying in detail the senses and the nervous system.
We may, further, endeavor to render our knowledge of mental phenomena
more full and accurate by experimentation. In doing this we may be
compelled to make use of elaborate apparatus. Of such mechanical aids
to investigation our psychological laboratories are full.
It is to such work as this that we owe what is called the
"physiological" and the "experimental" psychology. One can carry on
such investigations without being a metaphysician. But one can
scarcely carry them on without having a good knowledge of certain
sciences not commonly supposed to be closely related to psychology at
all. Thus, one should be trained in chemistry and physics and
physiology, and should have a working knowledge of laboratory methods.
Moreover, it is desirable to have a sufficient knowledge of mathematics
to enable one to handle experimental data.
The consideration of such facts as these sometimes leads men to raise
the question: Should psychology affiliate with philosophy or with the
physical sciences? The issue is an illegitimate one. Psychology is
one of the philosophical sciences, and cannot dispense with reflection;
but that is no reason why it should not acknowledge a close relation to
certain physical sciences as well. Parts of the field can be isolated,
and one may work as one works in the natural sciences generally; but if
one does nothing more, one's concepts remain unanalyzed, and, as we
have seen in the previous section, there is some danger of actual
misconception.
[1] "Psychology," Preface.
CHAPTER XVIII
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS
71. COMMON SENSE ETHICS.--We may, if we choose, study the actions of
men merely with a view to ascertaining what they are and describing
them accurately. Something like this is done by the anthropologist,
who gives us an account of the manners and customs of the various races
of mankind; he tells us _what is_; he may not regard it as within his
provinc
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