ptions made in all
the special sciences, _e.g._ the assumption that there is a world of
real things and that we can know them and reason about them. We are
not introduced to such problems as: What _is_ truth? and Is _any_
knowledge valid? Nor does it seem at once apparent that the man who is
studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical
discipline.
67. THE "MODERN LOGIC."--It is very puzzling for the student to turn
from such a text-book as the one above mentioned to certain others
which profess to be occupied with the same science, and which, yet,
appear to treat of quite different things.
Thus, in Dr. Bosanquet's little work on "The Essentials of Logic," the
reader is at once plunged into such questions as the nature of
knowledge, and what is meant by the real world. We seem to be dealing
with metaphysics, and not with logic, as we have learned to understand
the term. How is it that the logician comes to regard these things as
within his province?
A multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this
way, and in some great prominence is given to problems which the
philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own. The term "modern
logic" is often employed to denote a logic of this type; one which does
not, after the fashion of the natural sciences generally, proceed on
the basis of certain assumptions, and leave deeper questions to some
other discipline, but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself.
The tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those
writers who have been influenced by the work of the philosopher Hegel.
I shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more
inclined to be metaphysical than are those who belong to another, but
shall approach the broader question why the logicians generally are
inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other
special sciences, such as mathematics, for example. Of the general
tendency there can be no question. The only problem is: Why does this
tendency exist?
68. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.--Let us contrast the science of arithmetic
with logic; and let us notice, regarding it, the following points:--
It is, like logic, a _general_ science, in that the things treated of
in many sciences may be numbered. It considers only a certain aspect
of the things.
Now, that things may be counted, added together, subtracted, etc., is
guaranteed by the experience of the plain man;
|