man usually
believes. It is the night in which all cats are gray, and there
appears to be no reason why any one should harbor toward it the least
sentiment of awe or veneration.

Whether such reasonings as Mr. Bradley's should be accepted as valid or
should not, must be decided after a careful examination into the
foundations upon which they rest and the consistency with which
inferences are drawn from premises. I do not wish to prejudge the
matter. But it is worth while to set forth the conclusions at which he
arrives, that it may be clearly realized that the associations which
often hang about the word "idealism" should be carefully stripped away
when we are forming our estimate of this or that philosophical doctrine.

[1] "Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chapter VI, section 404.

[2] "Principles," section 148.

CHAPTER XIV

MONISM AND DUALISM

54. THE MEANING OF THE WORDS.--In common life men distinguish between
minds and material things, thus dividing the things, which taken
together make up the world as we know it, into two broad classes. They
think of minds as being very different from material objects, and of
the latter as being very different from minds. It does not occur to
them to find in the one class room for the other, nor does it occur to
them to think of both classes as "manifestations" or "aspects" of some
one "underlying reality." In other words, the plain man to-day is a
_Dualist_.

In the last chapter (section 52) I have called him a Naive Realist; and
here I shall call him a _Naive Dualist_, for a man may regard mind and
matter as quite distinct kinds of things, without trying to elevate his
opinion, through reflection, into a philosophical doctrine. The
reflective man may stand by the opinion of the plain man, merely trying
to make less vague and indefinite the notions of matter and of mind.
He then becomes a _Philosophical Dualist_. There are several varieties
of this doctrine, and I shall consider them a little later (section 58).

But it is possible for one to be less profoundly impressed by the
differences which characterize matter and mind. One may feel inclined
to refer mental phenomena to matter, and to deny them the prominence
accorded them by the dualist. On the other hand, one may be led by
one's reflections to resolve material objects into mere ideas, and to
claim that they can have no existence except in a mind. Finally, it is
possible to hold that both