e middle of October, 1915, General Townshend received some
reenforcements who had fought their way along the river, constantly
harassed by Bedouins and hostile tribesmen, reaching the British
position in a thoroughly exhausted condition. Even with the arrival of
the reenforcements General Townshend's force numbered little more than
a complete division, and a small reserve. During the stay at Azizi it
was rumored that a large contingent of troops was on its way from
India to strengthen the force at this place.

As time passed and nothing more was heard of these promised
reenforcements the small British army settled down with grim
determination to make the best of their situation, but there was a
general feeling among them that the Government had not acted fairly
by them in not sending help. It was evident that the Indian and
British Governments were imperfectly informed as to the strength of
the enemy's forces and of the means whereby they could fill up the
ranks when depleted by battle. This is the only explanation or excuse
that could be made. At no time did General Townshend's force number
more than four brigades, which, under the circumstances, was wholly
inadequate to accomplish the conquest of Bagdad.

General Townshend being thrown on his own resources proceeded to act
with extreme caution, for the whole fate of the British Expeditionary
Force hung in the balance. It was not a time to take venturesome
risks, for he could not spare a man. The Turks, fortunately, showed no
disposition to attack in force, but they resorted to methods of
guerrilla warfare.

The Turks had only left one brigade to hold their advanced position,
the remainder joining the forces established in the new fortifications
near Bagdad.

The rear guard remaining near Azizi did not allow the British to
forget their presence. They were well equipped with guns and at
frequent intervals sent shells into the British camp without, however,
doing much damage. Along the river they were strong enough to hold
back the British gunboats. For a time General Townshend pursued the
policy of watchful waiting, but one dark night toward the close of
October, 1915, the opportunity arrived for an operation which promised
success. Two brigades were sent out to make a long detour, with the
object of getting behind the Turkish position. This, it was expected,
would take most of the night. At sunrise it was proposed that another
brigade should make a frontal attack