to submarine commanders governing the
conduct of their operations. For some time before the sinking of the
_Arabic_ the German submarine commanders had been conforming closely
to the rules of search and seizure demanded by the United States. The
sudden divergence from this procedure in the sinking of the _Arabic_,
according to the accepted reports, implied that the submarine
commander had contravened instructions, or could plead justification.
Germany was indisposed to believe that the submarine commander had
disobeyed orders. But if he had done so, the German Government would
give "full satisfaction" to the United States. This assurance came
from the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the day
after Ambassador von Bernstorff had revealed Germany's conciliatory
spirit.
The United States consented to withhold judgment until Germany had
presented her side of the case. Meantime Count von Bernstorff urged
upon his Government the imperative necessity of making more
substantial concessions to the United States on the submarine issue.
Another catastrophe such as the sinking of the _Lusitania_ or
_Arabic_, he warned Berlin, would aggravate the situation beyond his
control. That Germany recognized the danger was shown by a further
declaration from her Imperial Chancellor on August 26, 1915, wherein
he endeavored to placate American feeling by declaring that the
sinking of the _Arabic_, if caused by a German submarine, was not a
"deliberately unfriendly act," but, if the accepted version of the
disaster proved to be true, was "the arbitrary deed of the submarine
commander, not only not sanctioned but decidedly condemned by the
German Government," and that the latter, being "most anxious to
maintain amicable relations with the United States, would express its
deep regret and make full reparation." This conditional promise was
made in the continued absence of any report from the implicated
submarine commander, whose silence became mysterious. The British
added to the perplexity by making the unqualified statement that the
submarine which sank the _Arabic_ had herself been sunk by a British
patrol boat.
While the United States waited significantly for Germany to make the
_amende honorable_, an internal conflict was proceeding in Berlin over
the submarine policy. The _Arabic_ crisis had been transferred to
Germany by the stand the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the
Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow,
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