he attacking submarine. On this reasoning a submarine
commander could excuse a wanton act on the plea of self-defense, which
Germany appeared eager to accept, whether the need of self-defense was
actual or fancied.

The Washington Government declined to consent to clothing a submarine
commander with the discretionary power of determining whether a vessel
should be sunk on sight because of movements he considered suspicious.
The German Government would absolve him from blame and repudiate any
obligation to grant indemnity, even if the commander was mistaken in
attributing aggressive intentions in a vessel's movements. Germany's
precept, as laid down by Count von Bernstorff in his note of September
1, 1915, and Germany's practice, as illustrated by the foregoing
defense for the sinking of the _Arabic_, were thus widely divergent.

The situation receded to the _Lusitania_ stage. Ambassador von
Bernstorff's assurances as to warning and safety to passengers were
negatived by the new condition that submarine commanders could
disregard instructions, whether right or wrong, in doing so. The
Administration accepted as convincing the abundant evidence before it
that the _Arabic_ made no attempt to ram the submarine. According to
this testimony, no one on board the _Arabic_ even saw the submarine;
only the torpedo was seen coming from the direction of the sinking
_Dunsley_, behind which, it was supposed, the submarine had been
screened when the _Arabic_ came in view, whereupon it submerged.
Moreover, the _Arabic_ was struck astern from a direction which showed
that the submarine was at right angles to her. If the _Arabic_ had
been heading toward the submarine with the intention of ramming it,
the torpedo should have struck her at the bow. But the _Arabic_
testimony was that the submarine was invisible.

Germany's explanation was so unsatisfactory, so discredited by the
overwhelming evidence of the _Arabic_ survivors, as well as being
qualified by an indirect recognition of the possibility that the
submarine commander might have erred, that the question of severing
diplomatic relations again became imminent. A resort to arbitration,
as proposed by Germany, with the nullifying condition that any
decision of a Hague tribunal was not to affect Germany's conduct of
submarine warfare, was not deemed worthy of serious consideration. The
question now was whether, after the pledge given by Count von
Bernstorff, the German Government int