the _Arabic_, saw nothing calling for perturbation, and, in casting
doubt on the accounts of the liner's destruction, hinted that a mine
was responsible. But the German Government, wisely informed by Count
von Bernstorff on the state of American feeling, knew better than to
belittle the situation. Pending the receipt of any report from the
submarine commander who sank the _Arabic_, it charged Ambassador von
Bernstorff to ask the American Government to defer judgment.
"The German Government," Count von Bernstorff pleaded, "trusts that
the American Government will not take a definite stand after hearing
the reports of only one side, which in the opinion of the Imperial
Government cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance be
given Germany to be heard equally. Although the Imperial Government
does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are
reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that
these statements are naturally made under excitement, which might
easily produce wrong impressions. If Americans should actually have
lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions.
The German Government would deeply regret the fact and beg to tender
sincerest sympathies to the American Government."
This statement, made five days after the _Arabic's_ destruction, was
viewed as the first ray of hope in the crisis. A disavowal of
unfriendly intent was seen in the regrets expressed for the loss of
American lives. There was a disposition to credit Germany with
cherishing a desire to avert a rupture with the United States and to
go to considerable lengths in that endeavor. This impression eased the
Washington atmosphere, which had been weighed by the President's
determination not to depart from the stand he took in the third
_Lusitania_ note, and also by Germany's apparent indifference to its
warning, as shown by her pursuit of submarine warfare seemingly
regardless of consequences.
What the "facts" were in the sinking of the _Arabic_ to which,
according to the German statement, the reports to hand could not
correspond, exercised official Washington. As the German Government
had not so far heard from the submarine commander of its own
acknowledgment, it could not itself be aware of this version of how
the _Arabic_ sank. Why Germany was so confident that the reports the
Administration accepted were inaccurate was explained on the surmise
that she had revised her orders
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