than likely to turn about and fight with the enemy. The alliance
between the British and the Beni Lam Arabs was of problematic value,
but it was worth while under the circumstances. It was better to
secure their friendship even temporarily, for the Arabs had been a
constant source of trouble from the time the British Expeditionary
Force entered Mesopotamia. Fighting to them was a pastime rather than
a serious business, and whenever the struggle became deadly they would
very likely disappear. A veritable nuisance to the British force were
the Arabs who hung around the skirts of the expeditionary force and
amused themselves by reckless sniping.

Conflicts with mounted bands offered no difficulties, for having no
artillery they would disappear among the dunes to be located later by
British aeroplanes, and could then be hunted down by columns of
infantry. When aeroplanes were not available, it was impossible to
follow their movements. Having perfect mounts they could afford to
laugh at a cavalry charge.

"They would simply melt away into thin air," wrote an officer at the
front, who had led a charge against these sons of the desert. "They
are a quaint mixture," he adds: "some of them being distinctly gallant
fellows, but the greater part are curs and jackals and will never take
you on unless they are at least three, or four, to your one.
Incidentally, they have the pleasant habit of turning on the Turks
(for whom they are nominally fighting) and looting and harassing them
as soon as they (the Turks) take the knock from us, and as a
consequence the Turk does not much care about having a real scrap with
us."

Sometimes the Arabs led the British into desert wastes where they
could get water from hidden springs known only to themselves, and
where the British soldier, who literally traveled on his water bottle,
suffered tortures from thirst under a heat that dried up the blood in
his veins. In some of these attempts to round up Bedouin marauders the
British lost a number of men because the water supply gave out. These
conditions will explain why in so many dispatches sent by General
Townshend from the front, it was stated that he had to fall back on
the Tigris because his troops lacked water. In such parts of the
country where it was possible to employ armed motor cars and even the
best Arabian steed could be run down, the Bedouins found their old
tactics of little account and were inspired with a wholesome fear of
the Briti