n't be done if they go
about their work in real earnest. With our heavy pieces useless they
can reduce the batteries on the other shore without trouble. The case
looks hopeless. You had better take my advice."

Following the advice thus given, the correspondent rose early next
morning and packed his few belongings, keeping, meanwhile, a watchful
eye on the tower of Kale-Sultanie, where the flag, showing that the
allied fleet was near, was usually hoisted. But the morning passed and
still the danger signal did not appear. Evidently the allied fleet was
not inclined to risk more such losses as those of the previous day,
when the _Bouvet_, _Irresistible_, and _Ocean_ went down and five
other ships were badly damaged. Yet even with the eleven remaining
ships, it appears from the Turkish admissions, the Dardanelles could
have been forced on March 19, 1915.

The correspondent visited several of the batteries during the day. The
damage done the day before was slight indeed, consisting mostly of
large earth displacements from the parapets and traverses. Four guns
were temporarily out of commission, but the general shortage of
ammunition made these pieces negligible quantities anyway.

Although the British information system in this field of operations
was efficient, it must have failed in this instance, for it seems
certain that with seventeen shells the battery in question would have
been easily disposed of, a channel could have been made through the
mine field, and the way to Constantinople would have been open.

All this was realized in the Turkish capital. The court made
arrangements to transfer to Akhissar Anatolia, and the German and
Austro-Hungarian Embassies were ready to leave for this ancient seat
of the Ottoman Government. The families of many German officers in the
Turkish service left Constantinople. In short, everybody understood
that a calamity was pending. What its exact nature was but a few knew.

Whatever truth there may have been in this particular story, there
seems to be little doubt that the Turks were woefully short of
ammunition. During the Balkan War it was reported on good authority
that much of their ammunition was defective. When countries like
France, England, and Russia hopelessly miscalculated the need of
ammunition for modern warfare, it is not asking too much of us to
believe that the Turks suffered in a worse degree.

Without direct or indirect communication with Germany, it is easy to
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