t still continued what it considered its
sound and well-matured policy of concentrating its forces for the
protection of its own frontiers against Austria, and looking on every
other enemy as secondary.

As regards the Balkans, it has to be recalled that it was Italy who
first suggested that Serbia receive the assistance of the Allies
against the superior Austrian forces. This suggestion was at that
early time taken into but slight consideration by France and Great
Britain. A battery or two was lent to Serbia by Great Britain, but
little more was done until the spectacle of invasion became imminent.
While Italy recognized that her interests were of a paramount
character in the Balkans, she was convinced that the war would be
decided in the main theatre, and not on any of the side theatres that
Germany might decide to choose. Nor was Italy under any
misapprehension as to what would be her fate were the Austrians to
succeed in breaking through the lines of defense on her northern
frontier. These considerations decided her against participating in
any over-sea adventure unless she was absolutely compelled to do so.

Italy's interest in the problem as to who was to dominate
Constantinople and the Dardanelles was less than that of either
England or Russia. The apologists of her policy of abstention
maintained, indeed, that jealousy of Russia was Great Britain's main
motive in deciding on the expedition to Gallipoli. Italy had a more
important work to do than to lend her aid in playing off one ally
against another. Any aid given to that expedition had, necessarily, to
be of a comprehensive character if success was to be achieved. This
would have meant a serious depletion of the Italian forces and might
have opened up a way that would have enabled the enemy to strike at
the very heart of Italy.

When the possibility of Bulgaria taking the side of the Central Powers
loomed into the domain of actuality, Italy with her nearer intuition
in Balkan affairs called attention to the impending denouement. In
this she was seconded by Serbia, who asked the aid of the Allies in
striking a blow which would have prevented what proved from the allied
point of view to be a calamity. Italy's suggestion was that Sofia be
at once occupied before Bulgarian mobilization could be got under way.
The policy of hoping against hope took the place of energetic action.
Then action on the part of the Allies followed when the blow had
fallen. Yet Italy