lbania. The situation was viewed with much concern in
Italy, where the ambition was to make the Adriatic an Italian sea. It
was an unsatisfactory result of a series of operations in which
Italian interests were vital, but in which Italians had taken but a
negligible part. The conquest of most of the territory north of
Greece had left the Austro-Germans with a large army released for work
elsewhere. French and British were intrenching strongly at Saloniki,
backed by a powerful fleet. The Italians still held Avlona. Greece
remained neutral, but was filled with resentment against the Allies,
who were repeatedly violating her territory. Bulgaria, flushed with
victory, now held her strong army in leash. Serbia and Montenegro had
gone down before the invader. Rumania was resisting every effort
whether by threat or force or cajolement to lead her into war. The
situation called for the most serious consideration from Italy and her
allies.

During February, 1916, M. Briand, the French Premier, was the guest of
the Italian Government in Rome, where he had gone with the object--the
words are M. Briand's--"of establishing a closer and more fruitful
cooperation between the Italians and their allies." Political
cooperation was complete, he declared, but military cooperation on
their part had been admittedly less so, and that was the supreme want
of the moment. Italy rightly hesitated to embark on adventure, but in
order to secure her political aims her primary object was identical
with that of her allies, namely, to break down the military strength
of the Central Powers. For this purpose it was necessary to strike
together, and strike at the enemy's heart. The world knew what
Italians wanted, and meant to get--the Italian Trentino and Trieste;
but frontal attacks were costly, as General Cadorna had discovered,
and the Italian strategist had not yet said his last word.

The fate of Trieste might perhaps be more quickly decided on the
Danube than on the Isonzo. There was a general agreement that an error
had been committed by the Allies in letting the Central Powers cross
the Danube into Serbia. Except along the 250-mile gap between the
Adriatic and the Serbo-Rumanian frontier, the Central Powers were
blockaded either by ships and soldiers or by neutral territory.
Opinions differed as to where the Allies should strike to reach the
heart of Germany, but there were many who thought that the first
offensive should be to close the gatewa