,
and Sebenico are almost in themselves sufficient to counterbalance any
numerical disparity between the Austrian and Italian fleets. Several
of these natural harbors have of late years been transformed, at
enormous expense, into naval ports and strongly fortified. Millions
have been spent on Sebenico, and it has been so fortified as to be
absolutely impregnable from the sea, even the rocks facing the harbor
having been cased in ferroconcrete and turned into forts. The claim of
Venice to be mistress of the Adriatic belongs to a remote age; it has
long since been ousted by Pola, which has gradually been developed
into one of the strongest naval arsenals and ports in the world.
Similarly the whole coast line of Dalmatia is fronted by a chain of
islands, round which submarines can receive supplies and lurk in
absolute security. In the rear of these islands is a succession of
navigable channels through which a war fleet can pass under cover from
Pola to Cattaro. The Italian coast line is the very antithesis of the
Austrian. Between Venice and Brindisi, the whole length of the
Adriatic, there is not a single natural harbor. But, said the
Italians:

"What is the good of a fine stable without horses?" Italy had the
ships, Austria the harbors: it remained to be seen which would win
out.

The bearing of all this on the question of Italy's cooperation with
the Allies in the Balkans is apparent. It had been frequently remarked
that the Dalmatian coast line was likely one day to bring on a
European war, for its possession is of vital interest to Italy.
Austria, with twelve naval bases and all the natural advantages of
coast line in her favor, is in a far stronger position than Italy. How
can Italy hope to occupy the Dalmatian coast? There was and is a
considerable diversity of opinion in Italy as to the wisdom of an
over-sea expedition in addition to the occupation of Avlona in
Albania. At one moment it was suggested that in view of the
preponderating call on the military resources of the country in the
areas of operations on the Isonzo, in Carnia, Cadore, and the
Trentino, it would be wiser to withdraw for the time being from
Avlona. But it would seem as though Italy is bound to see the thing
through. The place has been put into a state of comparative
impregnability. Italy is well aware that her line of communication
must remain more or less at the mercy of the Austrian fleet operating
from Pola and the naval bases along the c