who were constantly being poured into Saloniki by France and England
until, in the early spring, their total was variously estimated at
from 250,000 to 350,000 men of all services.

It was in these circumstances, then, that the Grand Duke Nicholas
ordered the advance upon Erzerum. They go far to explain the events of
the subsequent few weeks in and about the great Turkish Caucasian
fortress town.

Russian forces had, during the three months immediately preceding the
big offensive, prepared the way by the capture of points from which
the grand attack was to be launched. In command of the czar's troops
was General Judenich, although the Grand Duke Nicholas was officially
responsible for operations on this front. General Judenich had devoted
years of his life to a study of the special problems attending an
offensive in the Kars-Erzerum regions and carried through his task
with a skill and an expedition that have hardly their equal in the
history of the war.

The advance of the Russian forces upon Erzerum was made from three
points. It is well for the reader to keep this constantly in mind. It
was an application of the principle of the pincers, combined with a
great frontal attack, used so often and so successfully by the Germans
in their Russian drive. It adds tremendously to the difficulties of a
commander battling to defend a big position. Nowadays, under the new
conditions of warfare, fortresses or other positions are not defended
to the end. They are held just as long as it is safe for the army
within to hold out. But a commander must on no account endanger his
force. Discretion is more than ever the better part of valor, and "he
who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day," is the guiding
principle of the general of modern times.

Now this triple menace, striking not only on the front but on both
sides and menacing the roads by which a defeated army must retreat,
seriously weakens the defense which an army within a fortress can
make. It was just such an operation or series of operations that
carried the tremendously strong fortress of Antwerp in record time,
that accounted for the surprising fall of Namur in two days, and that
explains the rapidity with which a score of almost impregnable Russian
fortresses in Poland fell before the rush of the German avalanche.

The triple Russian thrust at Erzerum was made from Olty, which had
been captured as far back as August 3, 1915, along the Kars-Erzerum
road b