r troops from the
western front and rushed them off to Saloniki, but much too late to
succor Serbia.

Finally, so powerful became the influences calling upon the Government
to retire from the Dardanelles with as much grace as possible that the
opinion of Sir Ian Hamilton was asked. Probably the inside truth of
the affair will not be known for some years, but it later developed
that there was considerable friction between Sir Ian Hamilton and the
British War Office at the time. Sir Ian, it is known, laid a large
part of blame for the failure at the Strait to the fact that Earl
Kitchener did not send him large reenforcements that were expressly
promised. At any rate he was against a withdrawal from Gallipoli in
the circumstances and in favor of a swift and overwhelming assault
with all the troops and forces that could be gathered. He was still
firmly convinced that the forcing of the Dardanelles was possible and
probable.

Just what were the relations between France and England, and
especially how they each regarded the Dardanelles campaign in the
winter of 1915, it is impossible to say with any degree of assurance.
It is known, however, that there were serious differences of opinion,
not only among the more influential men in both Paris and London, but
between the two Governments.

Obviously, the British were the more reluctant to abandon the project,
which had been entered upon with so much confidence and enthusiasm. It
was distinctly a British operation, although the French Government had
given its unqualified approval at the start and had loyally
contributed all the troops it could spare. But the plans had been
drawn up in London and had been worked out by British commanders; and
the acknowledgment of failure was a confession of British, not French,
incompetency. It was a blow at British prestige such as had not been
dealt since the early disasters of the Boer War.

While the whole question of the Gallipoli campaign was being
reconsidered there occurred something that had a profound effect upon
subsequent events in that part of the war area and elsewhere. The
defeat of the Russians while the French and British troops were
unable, through lack of preparation and foresight, to carry on an
energetic offensive that might have drawn the Germans from their Slav
prey, convinced all the allied Governments that the time had arrived
for a thorough revision of their system of cooperation. In short, if
the war was to be won