im may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy)
military situation.

However scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others,
the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of
workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy's
future action.

The enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the purpose of the
enemy's mission. The situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad
in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. This, in
turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information
available.

It may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when
accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. However, as
previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. The
commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out
will attain the purpose. By being inclusive instead of restrictive in
this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities.
Moreover, the information available will not always justify the
derivation of a specific task.

By this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied
opinion as to the enemy's appropriate effect desired. The commander's
safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. He
expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy's
objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail
to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the
situation.

Situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in
Section II-B (page 135), no value can be assigned the factor of the
appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis
for deducing enemy courses of action. Such situations are not unusual,
especially in problems of lesser scope. In such cases, the commander
is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which
can materially influence his own plan. Therefore, in instances of this
nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first
consideration to the commander's own courses of action affords the
advantage of (see page 134) narrowing the field as to the enemy
capabilities.

B. Survey of Enemy Capabilities.

If, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the
commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a
sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now
proceeds, by the mental proc