es his thought on the effect to be produced,
on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the
enemy, on the modification in the enemy's effort which will be
caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will
create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome
the obstacles.

It will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate
the enemy situation during this analysis. Such necessity arises
because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy
situation. The commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as
to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the
planned action against him becomes evident. This re-estimate of the
situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are
familiar through previous examination. Sometimes the re-estimate will
have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments
may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of
this contingency. Sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after
reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy
estimate (Section III). The particular procedure adopted is
unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a
re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to
this portion of the Estimate.

The foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination
into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself
in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original
situation from the enemy viewpoint. In addition, the commander
examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed
situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has
superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. Thus only can the
commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his
own proposed courses of action. Thus only may sound conclusion later
be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course
of action, or combination of courses, is the best.

The comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to
the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his
own retained courses of action. Another method is to imagine the enemy
as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against
each of the commander's courses. This method is applicable, for
instance, t