ess described in Section II, to list the
enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. If there be
no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all
enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort.

The survey of fighting strength (Section I-B) has established, through
consideration of the "means available and opposed", and of the
"characteristics of the theater", the limitations of enemy
capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. Because, however, so
much of the enemy's situation is usually conjectural, it is important
to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in
Section I-B,--in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and
strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. Such a study will
disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. The
commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which
can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the
commander's courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities
of obtaining information concerning the enemy's moves.

Such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations
which presumably can materially affect his own plans. He may now list
the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of
action, for purposes of further analysis. Naturally, he lists courses
which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to
consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of
the estimate.

C. Application of Tests for Suitability, Feasibility, and
Acceptability.

Having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above,
the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and
for acceptability as to their consequences.

The procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (Section
II). However, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if
deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for
suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's
own courses of action. By the same token, since the enemy's fighting
strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis,
the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the
commander's own courses. In fact, if there are any reasonable doubts
as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly
retained for further consideration. The same considerations and the
same