later
observed, to a Decision adopting an objective short of that which
would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task.

SECTION III

EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY

While the commander realizes that the Fundamental Military Principle
(page 41) governs the enemy's problem no less than his own, he has to
accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called "fog of war")
in applying the principle to the enemy's situation. The method of
reflective thinking utilized (Section II) for the commander's own
problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the
enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known
to the commander as are his own.

Capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which
the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such
actions, has the capacity to carry out. Such potentialities of the
enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in
estimating the situation. In his estimate, however, the commander's
interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do;
probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the
whole field of capabilities. The commander is not exclusively
interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the
enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are
also subject to change. The commander is interested in everything that
the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander's own
courses of action.

In reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes
an estimate from the enemy's viewpoint and considers that the enemy
commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is
endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission.
Each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable
military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the
same intent. The physical objectives for each may be the other's armed
forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also
be likely physical objectives.

In such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the
opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual
conflict. More especially in the initial stages, the respective plans
may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. Again, the
geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss