in this task than absolute realism. The difference
between them becomes much less marked when we reflect that the former,
like the latter, must reserve the predicate of being for the unity of
the whole. Even though evil and contradiction belong to the essence of
things, move in the secret heart of a spiritual universe, the reality is
not these in their severalty, but that life within which they fall, the
story within which they "earn a place." And if absolute idealism has
defined a new perfection, it has at the same time defined a new
imperfection. The perfection is rich in contrast, and thus inclusive of
both the lights and shades of experience; but the perfection belongs
only to the composition of these elements within a single view. It is
not necessary to such perfection that the evil should ever be viewed in
isolation. The idealist employs the analogy of the drama or the picture
whose very significance requires the balance of opposing forces; or the
analogy of the symphony in which a higher musical quality is realized
through the resolution of discord into harmony. But none of these
unities requires any element whatsoever that does not partake of its
beauty. It is quite irrelevant to the drama that the hero should
himself have his own view of events with no understanding of their
dramatic value, as it is irrelevant to the picture that an unbalanced
fragment of it should dwell apart, or to the symphony that the discord
should be heard without the harmony. One may multiply without end the
internal differences and antagonisms that contribute to the internal
meaning, and be as far as ever from understanding the external
detachment of experiences that are not rational or good in themselves.
And it is precisely this kind of fact that precipitates the whole
problem. We do not judge of sin and error from experiences in which they
conduct to goodness and truth, but from experiences in which they are
stark and unresolved.

In view of such considerations many idealists have been willing to
confess their inability to solve this problem. To quote a recent
expositor of Hegel,

"We need not, after all, be surprised at the apparently
insoluble problem which confronts us. For the question has
developed into the old difficulty of the origin of evil, which
has always baffled both theologians and philosophers. An
idealism which declares that the universe is in reality
perfect, can find, as most forms of