hich of itself finds entrance into the mind,
. . . a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even
though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there
worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the
inclinations . . . ? It can be nothing less than a power which
elevates man above himself, . . . a power which connects him
with an order of things that only the understanding can
conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the
whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable
existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all
ends."[387:12]

With Kant there can be no morality except conduct be attended by the
consciousness of this duty imposed by the higher nature upon the lower.
It is this very recognition of a deeper self, of a personality that
belongs to the sources and not to the consequences of nature, that
constitutes man as a moral being, and only such action as is inspired
with a reverence for it can be morally good. Kant does little more than
to establish the uncompromising dignity of the moral will. In moral
action man submits to a law that issues from himself in virtue of his
rational nature. Here he yields nothing, as he owes nothing, to that
appetency which binds him to the natural world. As a rational being he
himself affirms the very principles which determine the organization of
nature. This is his _freedom_, at once the ground and the implication
of his duty. Man is free from nature to serve the higher law of his
personality.

[Sidenote: Kantian Ethics Supplemented through the Conceptions of
Universal and Objective Spirit.]

Sect. 192. There are two respects in which Kant's ethics has been
regarded as inadequate by those who draw from it their fundamental
principles. It is said that Kant is too rigoristic, that he makes too
stern a business of morality, in speaking so much of law and so little
of love and spontaneity. There are good reasons for this. Kant seeks to
isolate the moral consciousness, and dwell upon it in its purity, in
order that he may demonstrate its incommensurability with the values of
inclination and sensibility. Furthermore, Kant may speak of the
principle of the absolute, and recognize the deeper eternal order as a
law, but he may not, if he is to be consistent with his own critical
principles, affirm the metaphysical being o