illed, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is
concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these
contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience,
but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life."[385:11]

[Sidenote: The Realistic Tendency in Absolute Idealism.]

Sect. 190. As has been already intimated, at the opening of this
chapter, the inclusion of the whole of reality within a single self is
clearly a questionable proceeding. The need of avoiding the relativism
of empirical idealism is evident. But if the very meaning of the
self-consciousness be due to a certain selection and exclusion within
the general field of experience, it is equally evident that the
relativity of self-consciousness can never be overcome through appealing
to a higher self. One must appeal _from_ the self to the realm of things
as they are. Indeed, although the exponents of this philosophy use the
language of spiritualism, and accept the idealistic epistemology, their
absolute being tends ever to escape the special characters of the self.
And inasmuch as the absolute self is commonly set over against the
finite or empirical self, as the standard and test of truth, it is the
less distinguishable from the realist's order of independent beings.

[Sidenote: The Conception of Self-consciousness Central in the Ethics of
Absolute Idealism. Kant.]

Sect. 191. But however much absolute idealism may tend to abandon its
idealism for the sake of its absolutism within the field of metaphysics,
such is not the case within the field of ethics and religion. The
conception of the self here receives a new emphasis. The same
self-consciousness which admits to the highest truth is the evidence of
man's practical dignity. In virtue of his immediate apprehension of the
principles of selfhood, and his direct participation in the life of
spirit, man may be said to possess the innermost secret of the universe.
In order to achieve goodness he must therefore recognize and express
_himself_. The Kantian philosophy is here again the starting-point. It
was Kant who first gave adequate expression to the Christian idea of the
moral self-consciousness.

"_Duty!_ Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that
would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest
forth a law w