ruth.

But the absolutist, on the other hand, contends that the thinker must
_mean_ something by the reality which he seeks. If he had it for the
looking, thought would not be, as it so evidently is, a purposive
endeavor. And that which is meant by reality can be nothing short of the
fulfilment or final realization of this endeavor of thought. To find out
what thought seeks, to anticipate the consummation of thought and posit
it as real, is therefore the first and fundamental procedure of
philosophy. The mechanism of nature, and all matters of fact, must come
to terms with this absolute reality, or be condemned as mere appearance.
Thus Plato distinguishes the world of "generation" in which we
participate by perception, from the "true essence" in which we
participate by thought; and Schelling speaks of the modern experimental
method as the "corruption" of philosophy and physics, in that it fails
to construe nature in terms of spirit.

[Sidenote: Concessions from the Side of Absolutism. Recognition of
Nature. The Neo-Fichteans.]

Sect. 199. Now it would never occur to a sophisticated philosopher of
the present, to one who has thought out to the end the whole tradition
of philosophy, and felt the gravity of the great historical issues, to
suffer either of these motives to dominate him to the exclusion of the
other. Absolutism has long since ceased to speak slightingly of physical
science, and of the world of perception. It is conceded that motions
must be known in the mechanical way, and matters of fact in the
matter-of-fact way. Furthermore, the prestige which science enjoyed in
the nineteenth century, and the prestige which the empirical and secular
world of action has enjoyed to a degree that has steadily increased
since the Renaissance, have convinced the absolutist of the intrinsic
significance of these parts of experience. They are no longer reduced,
but are permitted to flourish in their own right. From the very councils
of absolute idealism there has issued a distinction which is fast
becoming current, between the World of Appreciation, or the realm of
moral and logical principles, and the World of Description, or the realm
of empirical generalizations and mechanical causes.[402:1] It is indeed
maintained that the former of these is metaphysically superior; but the
latter is ranked without the disparagement of its own proper categories.

With the Fichteans this distinction corresponds to the distinction in
the