be impossible that pure and unalloyed goodness should
constitute a universe of itself. But that a maximum of goodness, with
all of the accessories which it might involve, should be thus
self-subsistent, is quite conceivable. It is thus possible to define an
absolute and perfect order, in which logical necessity, the interest of
thought, or moral goodness, the interest of will, or both together,
should be realized to the maximum. Absolutism conceives reality under
the form of this ideal, and attempts to reconstruct experience
accordingly. But is the prospect of success any better than in the cases
of materialism and subjectivism? It is evident that the ideal of logical
necessity is due to the fact that certain parts of knowledge approach it
more closely than others. Thus mechanics contains more that is arbitrary
than mathematics, and mathematics more than logic. Similarly, the theory
of the evolution of the planetary system, in that it requires the
assumption of particular distances and particular masses for the parts
of the primeval nebula, is more arbitrary than rational dynamics. It is
impossible, then, in view of the parts of knowledge which belong to the
lower end of the scale of rationality, to regard reality as a whole as
the maximum of rationality; for either a purely dynamical, a purely
mathematical, or a purely logical, realm would be more rational. The
similar disproof of the moral perfection of reality is so unmistakable
as to require no elucidation. It is evident that even where natural
necessities are not antagonistic to moral proprieties, they are at any
rate indifferent to them.

[Sidenote: Error and Evil Cannot be Reduced to the Ideal.]

Sect. 212. But thus far no reference has been made to error and to evil.
These are the terms which the ideals of rationality and goodness must
repudiate if they are to retain their meaning. Nevertheless experience
contains them and psychology describes them. We have already followed
the efforts which absolute idealism has made to show that logical
perfection requires error, and that moral perfection requires evil. Is
it conceivable that such efforts should be successful? Suppose a higher
logic to make the principle of contradiction the very bond of
rationality. What was formerly error is now indispensable to truth. But
what of the new error--the unbalanced and mistaken thesis, the
unresolved antithesis, the scattered and disconnected terms of thought?
These fall outsid