Sect. 215. But, secondly, there can be no lack of incentive to goodness
in a universe which, though not all-good, is in no respect incapable of
becoming good. That which is mechanically or logically necessary, and
that which is psychically present, _may be good_. And what can the
realization of goodness mean if not that what is natural and necessary,
actual and real, shall be also good. The world is not good, will not be
good, merely through being what it is, but is or shall be made good
through the accession of goodness. It is this belief that the real is
not necessarily, but may be, good; that the ideal is not necessarily,
but may be, realized; which has inspired every faith in action.
Philosophically it is only a question of permitting such faith to be
sincere, or condemning it as shallow. If the world be made good through
good-will, then the faith of moral action is rational; but if the world
be good because whatever is must be good, then moral action is a
tread-mill, and its attendant and animating faith only self-deception.
Moral endeavor is the elevation of physical and psychical existence to
the level of goodness.

"Relate the inheritance to life, convert the tradition into a
servant of character, draw upon the history for support in the
struggles of the spirit, declare a war of extermination
against the total evil of the world; and then raise new armies
and organize into fighting force every belief available in the
faith that has descended to you."[423:14]

Evil is here a practical, not a theoretical, problem. It is not to be
solved by thinking it good, for to think it good is to deaden the very
nerve of action; but by destroying it and replacing it with good.

[Sidenote: The Justification of Faith.]

Sect. 216. The justification of faith is in the promise of reality. For
what, after all, would be the meaning of a faith which declares that all
things, good, bad, and indifferent, are everlastingly and necessarily
what they are--even if it were concluded on philosophical grounds to
call that ultimate necessity good. Faith has interests; faith is faith
_in_ goodness or beauty. Then what more just and potent cause of despair
than the thought that the ideal must be held accountable for error,
ugliness, and evil, or for the indifferent necessities of
nature?[424:15] Are ideals to be prized the less, or believed in the
less, when there is no ground for their impeachment? How much more