d in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382]
punish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order of
causes that make action exist. Thus it comes about that not only pains and
effort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers in
mind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them. That
is why the precept _Ora et labora_ (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus not
only those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events)
maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also
those who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in
their time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events by
their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of
destroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it.
For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a
necessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will
follow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a
consequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies
contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will
is determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has the
greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit
that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only
that of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have complete
indifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of
inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render
absolutely necessary the resolution taken.

OBJECTION IV

Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather
contributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary
thereto.

God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, and
he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he
causes, although he is fully cognizant of it.

Therefore, etc.

ANSWER

I deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the sin,
but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without
committing a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting
unreasonably. I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383]
God himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that one
even opens the way to i