say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here
upon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate,
namely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are
injurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here
only in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what
Revelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been
exempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of
divine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly
indicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are:

1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality.

2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of itself,
save in evil or useless herbs.

3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance.

4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband.

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5. The pains of childbirth.

6. The enmity between man and the serpent.

7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placed
him.

But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of
matter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to him
that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, and
that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of
life has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might have
something to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our author
on the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I have
judged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subject
of our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom.

12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing to
explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up half
of the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that of
physical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For,
as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes rather
from that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common,
according to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power of
choosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It is
a very great paradox to assert that the g