eves, like everyone else (save for some doctors who are
enveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by the
representation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion that
there is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected
by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet he
adds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since if
there were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can
cause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the world
censures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harm
without necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate
and by no means culpable; that there would be no difference between
physical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true cause
of an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be either
blamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action may
serve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one would
find fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418]
threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further,
according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the
prevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evil
already done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitude
would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without which
the mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient
reason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives the
resolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true,
one must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, and
would depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground
for hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree
together in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to
us, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusions
hold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makes
its resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an
opinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders
the soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countless
serious writers, of accepted authority, who are here pla
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