shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of
goodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents
of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means of
this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events.
The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3,
Sec. 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be
overcome by any of them; and he regards it (Sec.Sec. 20, 21, 22) as the soundest
foundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable of
limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason,
and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this
goodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in
objects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power is
independent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosen
object, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. For
whence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, if
it is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it the
goodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances?
It seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious,
which contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, non
invenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction
cannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that
when men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they
do so through other desires, which always have their foundation in the
representation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the
conclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does not
depend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human
life: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand
accidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I [425]
avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, by
an earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also deny
the inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only
actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not
depend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God,
if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is tha