ntation of the object within it
which contributes towards the determination. Now the representation does
not come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity.
Objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical
causes, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his
wisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects,
but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus
this kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of
the substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though
free power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferent
to the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must have
its origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything from
anything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for us
to imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere
indifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must
needs be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently,
however far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifference
in the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true that
these dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usually
to the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously
_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one
object is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is more
acceptable at one time than at another.
21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and he
undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, and
even that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothing
is to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, to
be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is therefore
absolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neither
be helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it were
an appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish to
abide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural
inclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings.
That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their [428]
nature, but by the will of God
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