to deprive God of all
consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifference
of God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as God
has chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all [430]
that which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerable
possible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them is
purely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once having
chosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to human
nature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with his
hypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the proposition
that when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same
time, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possible
advantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing could
be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to
overthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with
incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the
way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just
been said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not,
and wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in
order to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of
indifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is
asked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs
answer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the
best, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following
his own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that
there is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towards
creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that
our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5,
sub-sect. 4, Sec. 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of
equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures.
Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more
perfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or
less with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there
will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus
comes back to my princ