: whereas if that will be excluded neither
good nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writers
of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason
which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems to
me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the
consideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that
they cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instance
of self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by
the goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is
necessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us
that it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, or
rather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and
influenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that his
understanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how
everything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him
the good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder,
the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness
makes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by
himself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized
and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his
understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his
inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be
deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it
possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas
before the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas
which are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author so
strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would
subvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent of
will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be
independent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it
not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than
others of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others
for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that
the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that
are calle